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Abstract
We investigate a multi-agent model of firms in an R&D network. Each firm is charac-
terized by its knowledge stock xi(t), which follows a non-linear dynamics. It can grow with
the input from other firms, i.e., by knowledge transfer, and decays otherwise. Maintaining
interactions is costly. Firms can leave the network if their expected knowledge growth is
not realized, which may cause other firms to also leave the network. The paper discusses
two bottom-up intervention scenarios to prevent, reduce, or delay cascades of firms leaving.
The first one is based on the formalism of network controllability, in which driver nodes are
identified and subsequently incentivized, by reducing their costs. The second one combines
node interventions and network interventions. It proposes the controlled removal of a single
firm and the random replacement of firms leaving. This allows to generate small cascades,
which prevents the occurrence of large cascades. We find that both approaches successfully
mitigate cascades and thus improve the resilience of the R&D network.
1 Introduction
Interventions belong to the tool box of systems design [25]. The ability to influence systems such
that they reach a desired state or show a desired behavior, is not only of relevance for engineers
and operators. This ability is also favored by managers or politicians, who wish to steer the
dynamics of socio-economic systems towards a particular outcome. Most of the interventions in
economic systems are targeted at the macro level, for instance by adjusting tax rates or legal
conditions. They follow a top-down approach: a centralized decision to change some “boundary
conditions” induces an adaptation of the system, hopefully in the right, i.e., wanted, direction.
This approach is contrasted with the bottom-up approach that targets system elements rather
than systems as a whole [23, 3, 13]. It plays a major role in complex systems comprising a
large number of elements, denoted as agents in the following. Bottom-up interventions can be
targeted either at specific agents or at their interactions or at the network as a whole [30]. In
socio-economic systems, agent specific interventions include, for example, monetary incentives
(e.g., reduced costs, bonuses) or privileged access to resources (e.g., information, credit) [17, 34].
Complex socio-economic systems are often represented as networks, where agents are depicted as
nodes and their interactions as links. To utilize a bottom-up approach of interventions requires
to solve a number of problems that are later addressed also in this paper. First of all, we need
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to find out which agents are the most promising ones to drive a system, i.e., we need to identify
driver nodes. This problem can be only tackled if we know how agents influence another, i.e., we
need to specify the dynamics on the network. Secondly, we need to determine the desired state
of the system, and eventually we need to calculate the appropriate intervention that is suitable
to drive the network towards this state.
These problems are exacerbated if, in addition to the dynamics on the network, there is also
a dynamics of the network. That means, the network itself changes because (i) agents join or
leave the network or (ii) add, remove, or rewire their links to other agents. The dynamics of the
system is then described by two time scales, one for the interactions, and one for the change of
the network. Most real-world socio-economic systems are characterized by these couplings of time
scales. For example, online social networks become quite volatile because users enter and exit
and also change their interactions with other users at high frequency. This makes it difficult to
assess the robustness of such systems. If users start to leave and this way generate large cascades
of other users leaving, these networks may even collapse [9].
To model the direct and indirect impact of nodes leaving a network, two different approaches are
followed. The first one focuses on the network topology, specifically on the degree of the nodes
and their embedding. One example is the k-core decomposition model [2, 8] to explain cascades.
The second one also includes the internal dynamics of the nodes, for example the threshold model
[11, 32]. Combinations of these approaches, such as the KQ model [35] lead to a better formal
understanding of the emergence of systemic risk [19, 4, 5], i.e., the collapse of a large part of the
system because of failure cascades.
Also economic networks are prone to failure cascades and decline [27, 24]. In this paper, we
discuss the case of R&D networks, used for the knowledge exchange between firms. Empirical
studies have shown that such networks exhibit a life cycle dynamics, i.e., they grow and later
decay [29, 22] because in R&D collaborations firms usually terminate their interactions after
some time. Either the purpose of their collaborations is fulfilled, e.g., a number of patents are
filed, or it is not fulfilled. For example, firms have not obtained an expected knowledge stock
or an expected growth of knowledge and therefore decide to leave the network to save the costs
involved in collaborations. If firms leave, this may cause other firms to leave as well, because
they lost the input from their collaboration partners. Thus, before we can think of interventions,
we need to model this process, which is provided in Section 2.
Based on these insights, we will then develop two different approaches towards interventions in
Sections 3 and 4. The aim of these interventions is to prevent large cascades of firms leaving
the collaboration network. If that is not entirely possible, we want at least to reduce the size of
such cascades, or to delay them. Our first approach is rooted in control theory [12, 28] applied to
complex networks, a recent development that lead to the concept of network controllability [18].
Basically, we identify a set of driver nodes with two different methods, to which an incentive is
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applied. The formal method relies on a linear dynamics on the network, which is often not given.
Generalizations to non-liner problems are not straightforward, as discussed in [33, 7]. For these
reasons, we will mainly use computational methods in this paper.
To contrast the formal approach, our second approach is based on heuristics, that means on
experience and intuition. It combines two different types of interventions: a network intervention,
targeted at the whole network to allow a continuous evolution, and a node intervention targeted at
only one firm. It was already shown, for the simpler case of a linear dynamics, that such heuristic
approaches can significantly improve the robustness of networked systems [6]. Here we investigate
the case of a non-linear dynamics and a fixed driver node. We are mainly interested to see
how this heuristic intervention fares in comparison to the formal intervention based on network
controllability. What are the advantages and shortcomings of these two different interventions?
And to what extent can they be applied to a knowledge exchange network of firms? These
questions will be discussed in Section 5.
2 Generation of Knowledge stock
2.1 A network model of interacting firms
Knowledge stock. In the following, we utilize a multi-agent model of firms i = 1, ..., N ,
which are each characterized by a scalar variable xi(t), their knowledge stock. This summarizes
for example the R&D (research and development) experience of a firm, measurable by its number
of patents and research alliances. xi can have continuous values which have to be positive, and
can change over time at a time scale t.
To specify this dynamics we first note that the value of the knowledge stock continuously de-
creases if it is not maintained. Hence, we consider a decay term −γxi(t) with a decay rate γ
characterizing the life time of the knowledge stock. To compensate for the decay, we need to
make assumptions about the growth of the knowledge stock. One could reasonably argue about
a source term that reflects inhouse R&D activities [10]. The main focus in our paper, however,
is on knowledge transfer. Therefore, we assume that the growth of xi is mainly driven by input
from other firms, i.e., by R&D collaborations, rather than by own research activities. This reflects
empirical observations for innovation networks of firms [29].
Network representation. To model knowledge transfer, we use a network, in which nodes
represent agents, i.e., firms, and links their interactions. The network approach implies that
interactions in a group of n firms, e.g., in R&D alliances between 2 to 10 firms, are decomposed
into dyadic interactions between any two of these n firms. We further consider direct interactions
between firms. I.e., an interaction i→ j describes that firm i transfers knowledge to firm j, but
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this does not necessarily has to be reciprocal, i.e., j 6→ i is possible. With N firms, there are
N(N −1) different directed dyadic interactions possible. Whether they take place is described in
an adjacency matrixA of size N×N , in which an entry aij = 1 indicates a link i→ j, and aij = 0
its absence. Empirical investigations have shown that such matrices for R&D collaborations are
usually sparse, that means the number of links is of the order N rather than N2. Based on the
entries in the adjacency matrix we can define the in-degree d+i =
∑
j aji of a firm i as the number
of incoming links from other firms, and the out-degree d−i =
∑
j aij as the number of outgoing
links to other firms. Note that in general aij 6= aji.
Knowledge growth. Our main assumption is that the knowledge growth of firm i is deter-
mined by the knowledge stock of those firms j that have direct link to i, as expressed by the aji,
i.e., it is proportional to xj(t), with the proportionality constant b to weight the benefit. Further,
it is reasonable to consider a saturation for the growth of knowledge stock. At higher levels of
xi, it becomes more difficult for firm i to “absorb” new knowledge, i.e., to incorporate it into a
firm because of the internal complexity associated with the way knowledge is stored and linked
internally. This absorptive capacity is for simplicity reflected in a quadratic term cˆ x2i , as known
from saturated growth dynamics [26].
The proportionality factor cˆ for the saturation effect, however, deserves a discussion, as there are
different arguments possible. It could be simply a constant, cˆ ≡ c0, to reflect that the saturation
effect depends mainly on the knowledge stock of firm i. On the other hand, it could be also an
individual variable, cˆ ≡ ci, to incorporate further influences. One possibility is a dependency
on the in-degree, c+i = cd
+
i , based on the argument that a larger number of firms transferring
knowledge to firm i makes the absorption of knowledge more difficult. Another possibility is a
dependency on the out-degree, c−i = cd
−
i , based on the argument that, in addition to the absorp-
tion of knowledge, firm i also has to maintain links to other firms j, which consumes resources,
and therefore exacerbates the problem. In this paper, we follow the latter argumentation which
was also used in [16], i.e., cˆ = cd−i .
Combining these assumptions, we propose the following dynamics for the knowledge stock [16]:
dxi(t)
dt
= −γ xi(t) + b
∑
j
aji xj(t) + b
ext
∑
j
pji xj(t)− cd−i x2i (t) (1)
Here, it is additionally considered that some links, denoted by pji, provide firm i with a direct
input from particular valuable firms. For example, instead of obtaining indirect knowledge input
from a firm k via other firms j, firm i would much more benefit if k had a direct link to i. So,
if pji = 1, there will be an extra benefit bext from interacting with this valuable agent. Such
shortcut externalities have been discussed e.g., in [16, p.247]. In the following, we drop this term
in the dynamics, to simplify the analysis.
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Figure 1: Dynamics of the knowledge stock, Eqn. (1), in a small network of 5 firms. The size of
a node is proportional to its in-degree.
Direct and indirect reciprocity. The above dynamics leads to a stationary, but non zero
value of the knowledge stock only if the network contains cycles of firms benefiting another, as
illustrated in Figure 1. The shortest possible cycle involves two firms, for example 1→ 2, 2→ 1
in Figure 1(a,b). This mutual interaction relates to direct reciprocity, as firm 1 contributes to
the knowledge stock of firm 2 and the other way round. But these cycles can be also larger,
as Figure 1(c) illustrates. In this case, firm 1 still contributes to the knowledge stock of firm 2,
but does not receive a reciprocal benefit from firm 2. Still, firm 1 benefits from being part of a
closed cycle 1 → 2 → 4 → 5 → 1, i.e., it receives an indirect benefit from firm 2, via firms 4
and 5. Such constellations relate to indirect reciprocity, which plays an important role also in the
emergence of cooperation [21]. Also the development of technology depends on the existence of
such feedback cycles [1]. Hence, links that contribute to closing these cycles in the interaction
network could for example receive an extra benefit, bext, although this is not considered here.
It is worth noticing that not all firms need to be part of cycles, to obtain a non-zero knowledge
stock. In Figure 1(a), we show a configuration where firm 3 benefits from the knowledge transfer
from firm 2, but does not contribute in a reciprocal manner. Because this even saves the costs
from maintaining the links, firm 3 obtains the highest value x3. Comparing Figure 1(a) with
Figure 1(b), we see that firm 3, even with a higher in-degree, does not necessarily have the
highest value x3. This points to the impact of the non-linear dynamics of the knowledge stock,
which cannot be simply reduced to the influence of in-degrees.
Eventually, we note that firms reach a non-trivial stationary knowledge stock only if they are
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connected to a cycle. In Figure 1(a) Firms 4 and 5 contribute to the knowledge stock of firm 1,
but do not receive any reciprocal contribution. Hence, x4 → 0 and x5 → 0 over time.
In general, the existence of non-trivial steady states, i.e., xi(t → ∞) > 0, for firms i that are
part of a network G, i ∈ V (G), can be ascertained by studying the irreducibility of the graph
G [14, 16]. In particular, the existence of at least one closed cycle in the graph is sufficient to
assure that both firms in the cycle and firms that receive links from firms within the cycle have
a non-zero stationary knowledge stock. Moreover, for special classes of graphs it is possible to
find analytical solutions for the values of the steady states [16].
2.2 Decision to leave the network
Knowledge stock and growth. Firms participate in knowledge transfer because they have
the expectation that their knowledge stock grows over time. So, it is reasonable to assume that
after the knowledge stock dynamics has converged to the stationary value, they evaluate the
performance. Based on this, they may decide to leave the network, i.e., to cut all their outgoing
links. Because this decision is based on the stationary values of the knowledge stocks, xstati ,
it takes place at a different time scale T , which is longer than the time scale t at which the
knowledge stock reaches its stationary value.
Specifically, we consider that at each time step T , firms compare (A) their absolute value of the
knowledge stock, xstati (T ) with a threshold, x
thr (equal to all firms), and (B) their growth of the
knowledge stock in the past time step, gi(T ) = xstati (T ) − xstati (T − 1) with a threshold, gthr
(equal to all firms). They decide to continue to collaborate only if both of their respective values
are above the thresholds. If any of these two conditions are not met, firms decide to leave with
a certain probability p, which implies that they do not immediately leave.
We note that both conditions reflect different aspects that influence firms decisions. Condition
(A) uses a cost/benefit assessment. If, in the current situation, the costs are higher than the
benefits from receiving knowledge input, firms may choose to leave. That means, higher values
of xthr consider a sensitivity for higher costs. Condition (B), on the other hand, captures to what
extent the expectations of firms regarding the growth of knowledge stock are met. Higher values
of gthr therefore indicate a lower tolerance of firms, if their expectations are not met.
If firms leave the network, this impacts the transfer of knowledge between firms in two ways:
(i) directly, because firms leaving no longer contribute to the knowledge stock of their previous
partners, (ii) indirectly, because firms leaving change the structure of the network and this way
also the cycles of indirect reciprocity. This, on the other hand, generates an impact on the
knowledge growth and the knowledge transfer of the remaining firms in the next time step.
Hence, at time T + 1 the remaining firms obtain a different knowledge stock, xstat(T + 1) and a
different growth rate, g(T + 1). This may cause other firms to leave the network, i.e., we observe
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T = 1 T = 2 T = 3
T = 4 T = 5 T = 6
Figure 2: Cascades of firms leaving a sample network ofN = 15 without any network intervention.
The position of the nodes is fixed and their size proportional to their current in-degree. Firms
colored in gray will leave the network in the next time step T . Parameters: γ = 0.5, b = 0.2,
c = 0.06, xthr = 0.05, gthr = 0.8, p = 0.1.
cascades of firms dropping out. Such observations are in qualitative agreement with empirical
studies about the life cycle of R&D network, where indeed a decline of firms participating can
be found [29].
An example. Figure 2 illustrates such a cascade of firms leaving the network. At time steps
T = 1, 5, the firms colored in gray leave the network because their knowledge stocks xstati (T ) fell
below the threshold value xthr (condition A). At time steps T = 2, 3, 4, 6, on the other hand, the
firms colored in gray leave the network because their expectations about their knowledge growth
gstati (T ) fell below the corresponding threshold g
thr (condition B). These firms have indeed a
high knowledge stock, i.e., they pass condition (A). That means, with just the comparison of
knowledge stock, we would not observe that a cascade emerges. The comparison of knowledge
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growth thus adds a new element to the dynamics. Because expectations are considered, we observe
in our model that also firms with a high knowledge stock and a high number of connections from
partners may decide to leave the network, which makes our model different from other cascade
models [32, 11, 5].
3 A formal approach to interventions
3.1 Interventions and network topology
The above discussion makes very clear that our interventions shall prevent the breakdown of the
network of firms collaborating in knowledge exchange. As our ultimate aim, we want to (i) prevent
cascades of firms leaving the network or, if that is not entirely possible, (ii) reduce the cascade
size such that the majority of firms still remains in the network, or (iii) delay the occurrence of
cascades such that the network remains at least for a given time horizon, T .
This closely relates to investigations of systemic risk, which is measured by the fraction X(t) of
failing agents/nodes in a system. Systemic risk usually emerges from the early failure of very few
agents, which affects other agents and causes them to fail, this way leading to a failure cascade.
If X(t) approaches 1, most parts of the system are destroyed. Therefore, we can quantify the
aim of our intervention strategies as keeping X(t→ T ) low, precisely below 0.5. This means, the
majority of firms stays in the network for a finite, but large time T .
This aim can be achieved by interventions on the network level and/or the node level. In the
following, we discuss two scenarios that combine interventions on these levels in different ways. We
start with addressing the node level. Here, the decisions of individual firms to leave is influenced
via their knowledge stock, Eqn. (1). A trivial approach would be to simply lower the costs c of
all firms, this way increasing their knowledge stock and forcing them to stay. Another trivial
variant would be to reduce the probability p of firms to leave if their conditions (A) or (B) to
stay in the network, are no longer met. We do not follow these trivial approaches which treat
all firms equal. Instead, we want to make use of an important feature that distinguishes firms,
their topological position in the collaboration network. This shall help us to identify which firms
should be subject to an intervention.
Large-scale empirical studies of R&D collaboration networks [29] have shown that their topology
is characterized by two distinct features: (i) a very broad degree distribution and (ii) a distinct
core-periphery structure. Firms belonging to the core are often hubs, i.e., they have more and
denser connections among each other, while firms in the periphery are only loosely connected to
the network (or even disconnected, which is not considered here). Thus, node interventions could
be targeted at core firms, or at firms from the periphery. Examples for these interventions have
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been already discussed in the literature [36, 6], and their performance depends on many details
both regarding the interaction dynamics and the network topology.
In our simulation studies, we will use sample networks exhibiting the mentioned topological
properties. But instead of testing all possible interventions, in this paper we only choose two
particular examples that combine information about the topological position of firms and their
knowledge stock, as outlined in the following sections.
3.2 Identifying driver nodes
To decide which firms should be targeted by an intervention, we choose the formalism of network
controllability [18, 33, 7], a research field at the intersection of complex networks and control
theory. It allows to identify a set of driver nodes, firms in our case, which are then targeted by
an intervention. Control means that applying a control signal to the driver nodes will allow us
to drive the dynamics on the network to a preferred outcome, in our case to values of knowledge
stock that would prevent firms from leaving the network.
The formalism of network controllability requires to know the dynamics on the network, i.e.,
changes in the state variables of the nodes. This is, in our case, given by the non-linear dynamics
of the knowledge stock of each firm, Eqn. (1). As long as this dynamics can be linearized, the
concept of structural controllability still applies. If a firm represents a driver node, additionally
a constant control signal ui is added to the dynamics of Eqn. (1). This leaves us with the tasks
to identify the set of driver nodes and to determine the control signals ui such that the dynamics
of the whole network is driven toward the desired state, which shows either (i) no, (ii) small, or
(iii) delayed cascades.
To determine the driver nodes, we choose two different approaches: (a) we identify all firms that
belong to the 20% with the highest knowledge stock xstati , and (b) we instead identify all firms
that belong to the 20% with the highest control contribution Ci, a measure for the ability of firms
to influence others, as described below. These two different sets of driver nodes are calculated on
the initial network, i.e., before any firm left.
To apply ranking scheme (a), we have to calculate the xstati (0) for all firms, which have non-zero
values only if the network contains cycles (see Sect. 2.1). For a linear dynamics we could simply
obtain the stationary values from solving the eigenvalue problem that makes use of the known
adjacency matrix A of the network. Unfortunately, the nonlinearities involved in Eqn. (1) do not
allow this procedure. Instead, for all time steps T , including T = 0, we have to run the dynamics
of Eqn. (1) at the time scale t and wait until it converges. Specifically, we have to resort on
numerical procedures, such as the standard lsoda FORTRAN ode solver by Linda R. Petzold
and Alan C. Hindmarsh, which is interfaced in most programming languages. We used the R
interface provided by the DeSolve R library. The computational effort involved was the main
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reason why we restrict ourselves to the simulation of relatively small networks. Our main goal is
to study the impact of network and node interventions, which can be sufficiently demonstrated
with small networks.
Our ranking scheme (b) uses the values of control contribution Ci of each firm. Here we only sketch
the idea behind this measure, the details are given in [37]. We first need to identify a minimum
set of driver nodes (MDS) required to control the whole network. Noteworthy, a network of size
N can be controlled by different MDS that not always contain the same set of nodes. Thus, the
probability that a node i becomes part of an MDS is denoted as P (Di), sometimes called control
capacity Ki [15]. Each driver node i in a MDS controls a non-overlapping part of Ni nodes of the
whole network. P (Ni) then denotes the probability that a given node is part of the subnetwork
controlled by node i. But we are interested in the conditional probability P (Ni|Di) that a given
node is part of the subnetwork controlled by i given that i is a driver node. This conditional
probability can only be obtained algorithmically as discussed in the mentioned approach of
structural controllability.
The upper bound of P (Ni|Di), normalized by the system size, is called control range, Ri [31].
I.e., it gives the maximum relative size of the network controlled by i. Control contribution Ci
now combines these two different information: Ci = KiRi. That means, Ci of node i captures the
probability for any node in a network to be controlled by node i joint with the probability that
i becomes a driver. A large value of Ci indicates a large impact of the respective node on driving
the whole network to a desired state. For an illustrative calculation of control contribution Ci we
refer to Ref. [37].
It is worth noticing that control contribution Ci is not simply correlated to other topological
measures, such as node degree, and thus indeed provides new information to characterize driver
nodes. Further, it was demonstrated on empirical and synthetic networks that identifying top
driver nodes by their control contribution rather than by alternative measures such as control
range or control capacity, leads to much improved results for network controllability [37].
If we compare the sets of driver nodes from the two different ranking schemes, we note only a
minor overlap in the chosen firms. This is understandable because a higher knowledge stock is
positively correlated with the in-degree of firms, whereas driver nodes chosen by their control
contribution mostly have a low in-degree.
3.3 Results of computer simulations
We illustrate the performance of our intervention scenarios by means of agent-based computer
simulations. These are motivated by the fact that our model involves two time scales: the network
structure changes at the time scale T , while the knowledge stock xi(t) of each firm changes at
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the smaller time scale t. To calculate from Eqn. (1) the stationary values xstati (T ), we resort to
numerical integration of the set of ordinary differential equations, as mentioned above.
In our first intervention scenario, we consider a larger number Nd of driver nodes, hence, we also
simulate a larger network, N = 200. The set of driver nodes contains the top 20% of firms in
both ranking schemes discussed in Section 3.2, i.e., Nd = 40. We recall that the sets of drivers
are determined based on the initial network and then kept as drivers.
Because firms decide to leave the network if the conditions (A) or (B) are met, the number of
firms in the network can only decrease. The systemic variable 1−X(T ) then gives us the fraction
of firms that remain in the network. It is of interest to us whether interventions on the driver
nodes are able to (i) prevent, (ii) reduce, or (iii) delay a network breakdown. Our reference case
is a scenario without any node interventions.
Whether or nor cascades occur depends, in addition to the network topology, also on the param-
eters of the model. We recall that in particular the two thresholds xthr and qthr determine the
conditions (A) and (B) under which firms decide to leave the network. Further, their knowledge
stock and knowledge growth depends on the parameters γ, b and c. All these parameters also
impact the control signal ui that is needed for the driver nodes to prevent firms from leaving the
network.
For our first intervention scenario, we have chosen ui(T ) ≡ u(T ) = 0.1c Θ[X(T ) − 0.05]. That
means the intervention is the same for all driver nodes and it is rather small, only 10% of the cost
factor c. Precisely, firms acting as driver nodes still bear 90% of the costs applied to all firms.
This is far from a scenario where firms are paid for staying in the network. Further, this reduction
of the costs is not applied continuously to all driver nodes at all times. The Heaviside function
Θ[x] ensures that the intervention takes place only if the cascade of firms leaving exceeds 5%,
i.e., X(T ) ≥ 0.05. This takes into account that, in real-world scenarios, there may be a delay
in implementing interventions and that it may take time for managers to realize the risk of a
potential network crash.
The threshold of 5% is not independent of the probability p that a firm indeed leaves the network
if either conditions (A) or (B) are met. Smaller values of p result in smaller cascades at a given
time T , and therefore slow down the process. We emphasize that this way we do not prevent
cascades. If the conditions (A) or (B) are not met, a firm will not stay in the network, but it
may not leave immediately. Thus the time scale of the cascade is impacted such that, hopefully,
the node intervention occurs in time.
Our choice of parameters shall prevent us from simulating trivial scenarios. Obviously, we can
always prevent cascades with (a) a very high level of u and (b) a continuous intervention at driver
nodes. This would immediately finish the paper. But we are more interested to learn if modest
interventions, i.e., small control signals placed at critical times and not continuously, would be
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able to prevent a network breakdown. That is why the parameters are chosen such that without
interventions a considerable fraction of firms would leave.
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0 25 50 75 100
T
1−
X
(T
)
Figure 3: Fraction of firms remaining in the network, 1 − X(T ) over time T for different inter-
ventions. Driver nodes are chosen from firms with the highest initial knowledge stock (black)
or with the highest initial control contribution (grey). Reference case: no node interventions
(blue). Parameters: γ=0.5, b=0.2, c=0.06, p=0.1.
Typical results of our node interventions are shown in Figure 3. Here we use a fixed time horizon,
i.e., Tmax = T = 100, i.e., we are only interested in the system dynamics during that given
period. This time horizon would, for example, be sufficient for managers to respond to the fact
that collaborating firms are leaving. We clearly see that, without any intervention, firms are
continuously leaving the network which ceases to exist after a short time. Using driver nodes
selected according to their high knowledge stock (ranking scheme a) can considerably improve
the situation because large cascades are delayed. They are, however, not prevented. But if driver
nodes are chosen according to their control contribution, cascades can be also prevented, at least
for the chosen time horizon T =100.
The interactions of firms and the emerging cascades follow a deterministic dynamics. But there
are random influences in the way the initial network is generated. For a network of size N , firms
randomly connect to N − 1 other firms with a certain probability q. The topology obtained this
way also impacts the cascade dynamics. In order to account for this, we have run 100 simulations
to find out, when the majority of firms have left, i.e., from each run we determine Tˆ from the
condition 1−X(Tˆ ) ≤ 0.5 and then average over Tˆ .
Our results show that, without any intervention, the average value is Tˆ avno = 36.7, but the median
is Tˆmdno =17. That means in half of all cases Tˆ was smaller or equal to only 17, which points to a
rather left skew distribution and a fast breakdown.
With our interventions, we are able to considerably mitigate this dynamics. Using control con-
tribution as the best ranking scheme, consistently, the average value increases by ∆Tˆ avcc = 40.1
compared to the case of no interventions, i.e., it doubles. More interesting, the median strongly
increases, and in more than half of the runs the maximum time horizon T = 100 is reached.
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We used a one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction for 100 observations, to
show that this improvement is statistically significant (p-value ≈ 5.6e− 15).
Using knowledge stock as the ranking scheme for driver nodes also delays large cascades signifi-
cantly compared to the case without interventions (p-value ≈ 1.86e− 12). But both the average
and the median values are slightly smaller than with control contribution as ranking scheme.
At the same time, we note that the differences between the two ranking schemes is not really
significant (p-value = 0.092). Taking into account the considerable effort in computing the initial
control contribution Ci(0) for all firms, we could argue that this effort does not pay off, at least
not for the given set of parameters.
Thus, the main difference in mitigating cascades is between no intervention and intervention.
For both ranking schemes, the total size of the cascades becomes significantly smaller, i.e., more
firms remain in the network, and the occurrence of cascades is also delayed. That means, while
we cannot completely prevent cascades of firms leaving, given our set of parameters, we can still
reach the aim of our interventions, namely to reduce and to delay them.
4 A heuristic approach to interventions
4.1 Combining node level and network level interventions
While the formal approach to node interventions was quite successful, as illustrated above, it
also has a number of drawbacks. Cascades were only reduced and delayed, therefore the number
of firms in the network necessarily decayed over time. Further, the intervention had to target a
larger number of firms. This implies a considerable effort because interventions are costly. First
of all, in a real economic network we need to get access to the firms we want to use as driver
nodes, and secondly, the control signal itself is also costly. We remind that u is used to lower the
costs of those firms that act as driver nodes.
Thus, we would like to have an intervention scenario that uses only a small number of drivers,
ideally only one firm, and that compensates for the loss of firms from cascades that could not
be prevented. Such a scenario is laid out in the following, and it combines interventions both on
the node and on the network level. We call this intervention heuristic because it is not derived
in a formal manner but based on intuition and experience. As we will show, it works surprisingly
well.
We start by describing the intervention on the network level, or systemic level, which shall be
used to compensate for the loss of firms. Here, we consider an instant replacement of firms leaving,
such that the total number of firms, N , is kept constant. The new firms create links to randomly
chosen partners with a small probability q, hence the expected number of new links is roughly
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N(T )q, where N(T ) = N −N ex(T ) is the number of firms in the network after N ex(T ) firms left
at time T . The random choice of partners is justified by the fact that newcomers do not have
complete knowledge about all established firms and their connections.
With this entry-exit dynamics the network topology continuously changes at time scale T . We
recall that it has changed already in the first intervention scenario because of firms leaving
the network. This has lead to a decreasing number of nodes and links. Now, instead, we have
approximately a constant number of nodes and links, but a more pronounced rewiring of the
topology resulting from the combined entry and exit of firms.
Interestingly, the fact that a loss of firms is always compensated does not imply that large
cascades of firms leaving are prevented. A random addition of new firms does not guarantee that
these firms are also well integrated in the network, therefore they may leave rather soon. So,
what is the advantage of this network intervention? It boosts the dynamics of the whole network
and occasionally leads to improvements. In fact, firms leaving may open up chances for new
firms connecting to the network, and this way generating a better knowledge transfer. Therefore,
we keep the random replacement of firms leaving as one element of our intervention scenario,
and call it the network intervention. Further, to ensure a continuous network dynamics, we will
replace the firm with the lowest xstati (T ) even in the rare case that no firm has decided to leave.
We emphasize that the network intervention does not imply any targeted control of firms. Instead,
it ensures that the network can constantly evolve on a time scale T . We will later test its impact
by comparing our combination of network intervention and node intervention with the previous
scenario, the targeted intervention of many firms without network intervention.
4.2 Targeting one firm
According to the network intervention, firms that leave the network at time step T are replaced
by new firms that randomly link to existing firms with a small probability q. This scenario
ensures a continuing development both of the network and the knowledge stock of firms. But
occasionally it can happen that no firm would decide to leave the network, given the conditions
(A) and (B). Then, according to the network intervention, we would replace the firm with the
lowest knowledge stock xstati (T ) by a new firm that randomly connects to the network, to keep
the system dynamics going.
We now propose our node intervention: instead of forcing the firm with the lowest knowledge
stock to leave the network, we force a specific firm which we call firm 1, to leave the network,
with probability p = 1. We choose as firm 1 a firm that initially belongs to the core of the
network. This firm is then replaced by a new firm 1. In case the new firm 1 may no longer be
part of the core, we will not apply our node intervention to firm 1 unless it becomes part of the
core of the network, again.
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This intervention approach sounds very odd, as our aim is to prevent cascades. Firms located at
the core of the network have a higher knowledge stock and are often involved in cycles. Therefore
their impact on the cascade dynamics is expected to be even larger. This raises two questions. Are
we able to “sacrifice” a core firm without enforcing a large cascade? The answer is yes, and it will
be illustrated in the small example below. The second and most obvious question is whether such
an intervention approach is indeed able to prevent large cascades of firms leaving. The answer
is yes, again, although it is quite counter-intuitive. But it is known already from the forest fire
model that small forest fires have the ability to prevent large forest fires [38]. Therefore, it makes
sense, from time to time, to remove a specific firm from the network in an ordered and controlled
procedure, to avoid situations in which large cascades can happen.
To let firm 1 leave the network implies an intervention that brings the knowledge stock of firm 1
below the threshold. We achieve our goal by simply increasing the cost c of only this firm, i.e.,
c ≡ c+ u1δ1,i. The Kronecker delta is δ1,i = 1 only if i = 1 and 0 otherwise. The critical level of
u1 is defined by the condition xstat1 (T ) − xthr < 0, i.e., u1 depends on the current network, but
only needs to be chosen sufficiently large.
An example. The complexity of our model results from the fact that the network of firms
changes on a time scale T , which impacts the possible outcome of the stationary knowledge
stocks of all firms. Therefore, we have to resort to numerical investigations. However, for the
simple case of only two firms, we are able to provide analytical insights which shall demonstrate
that this intervention is indeed able to drive the network dynamics to different states.
Let us assume two firms 1 and 2, where firm 1 is subject of the targeted intervention, as assumed
above. Each firm has only one directed link towards the other firm, and the dynamics of their
knowledge stocks follows from Eqn. (1):
dx1(t)
dt
=− γ x1(t) + b x2(t)− [c+ u1]x21(t)
dx2(t)
dt
=− γ x2(t) + b x1(t)− c x22(t) (2)
If u1 = 0, the stationary knowledge stock of both firms is given as
xstat1 = x
stat
2 =
b− γ
c
(3)
If u1 6= 0, then instead we find for the stationary values
xstat1 = Q ; xstat2 =
Z
b
; Z = [c+ u1]Q2 + γQ (4)
where Q is a quite involved function of the parameters b, c, u1 and γ, which we print in Ap-
pendix A.1. From Eqn. (4) we find that (i) the values of both xstat1 and xstat2 depend on the
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intervention u1 and (ii) that these values are decreasing functions of u1. That means, for both
firms:
xstat1 (u1 > 0) < x
stat
1 (u1 < 0) ; x
stat
2 (u1 > 0) < x
stat
2 (u1 < 0) (5)
The first inequality is understandable since a negative value of u1 would decrease the cost of firm
1, and hence increase its stationary knowledge stock. Because the influence of the intervention
u1 propagates from firm 1 to firm 2, we also find an increased stationary knowledge stock for
firm 2. Still, the influence of u1 on firm 1 is always stronger:
xstat1 (u1 > 0) < x
stat
2 (u1 > 0) ; x
stat
2 (u1 < 0) > x
stat
1 (u1 < 0) (6)
From Eqn. (6), we see that for a given threshold xthr > 0, there exist a critical level u˜1 > 0 such
that
xstat1 (u˜1) < x
thr < xstat2 (u˜1). (7)
This is proven in a Theorem presented in the Appendix. That means we can always find a critical
level u˜1 for the intervention such that firm 1 would leave the network, but firm 2 would stay in
the network, even though it is impacted by the intervention applied to firm 1.
x2
x1
1.6 3.53
3
2.5
2
2 2.5
Figure 4: Phase plot illustrating the dynamics of the knowledge stocks x1(t), x2(t) of two
firms, Eqn. (2). (red dashed line) u1 ≡ 0, (black solid line) u1 = 0.2.
We illustrate the impact of the intervention on firm 1 in Figure 4. It shows the dynamics of the
knowledge stock of the two firms with and without intervention by means of two trajectories in
a so-called phase plot, (x, y) ≡ (x1, x2). Both firms initially have a knowledge stock above the
threshold given by xthr = 1.6. The initial condition is marked by the black dot. Without any
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intervention, the knowledge stock of both firms would evolve along the dashed red line to the
stationary solution marked by the blue cross. The vector field shown indicates this dynamics.
However, with an intervention of firm 1, i.e., u1 = 0.2, we are able to drive the dynamics such
that it follows the black line and ends up in a stationary solution where xstat1 < xthr, while
xstat2 > x
thr, indicated by the blue dot. This demonstrates that our intervention to “sacrifice”
firm 1, i.e., to force it to leave, indeed works because it will not, at the same time, causes the
other firm to leave. Because there is no simple induction from the case of two firms to the case
of N firms, we will have to show the efficiency of the heuristic approach by means of computer
simulations, presented in the following.
4.3 Results of computer simulations
To illustrate our heuristic approach of combining network interventions and node interventions
we choose a rather small network with N = 20. Its evolution is studied over very long time T ,
to check the robustness of the system state achieved by our interventions.
Figure 5 shows the network from one run of our simulations, at three consecutive time steps.
For the decision of firms to leave we apply condition (A) and a leaving probability p = 1. The
color code indicates the stationary knowledge stock of each firm. Light blue means that firms
have a value xstati (T ) lower than the threshold x
thr and thus will leave the network immediately.
According to the network intervention, they are replaced by new firms that randomly connect to
the network. This part of our intervention scenario is applied at every time step T .
(a) T=250 (b) T=251 (c) T=252
Figure 5: Network evolution with a targeted intervention of firm 1 (always circled). Firms with
xstati (0) < x
thr (condition A) (marked in light blue) will leave the network.
Until T = 250, there were always one or more firms with a low knowledge stock that decided
to leave. At T = 251, Firm 1, which was already initially identified as a node from the core
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of the network, is targeted with an intervention for the first time. The intervals at which such
a node intervention becomes necessary fluctuate considerably. Averaging over a long time and
many simulations, we find that this intervention happened about every 11 time steps, i.e., in
about 11% of network interventions. The control signal forces firm 1 to leave the network, and
a new firm 1 enters and randomly links itself to the existing firms. This changes the adjacency
matrix and results in new stationary knowledge stocks for all firms. The subsequent snapshot at
the next time step is shown in Figure 5(c). We note that “sacrificing” firm 1 has resulted in a
network with an increased periphery.
What have we gained from this node intervention? First of all, we have ensured that the network
dynamics continues, which always has the potential to also reach states of better knowledge
exchange between firms. Secondly, we have generated a small cascade of firms leaving. While
this seems to be unnecessary at the current point, it may become important at a later time
because it may prevent a larger cascade in the future.
(a) (b)
Figure 6: Fraction of firms remaining in the network, 1−X(T ), over time T for different interven-
tions: (a) network intervention only, (b) network interventions and node interventions combined.
To demonstrate this effect, we have plotted, from a single run, the fraction of firms remaining
in the network, 1 − X(T ), over time T for the cases of (a) only network intervention and (b)
combined network and node intervention. The results are shown in Figure 6(a,b). We recall that
without the network intervention, we would observe a cascade of firms leaving such that the
system dynamics ends rather soon (see also Figure 2). With only the network intervention, we
can prolong the existence of the network considerably as Figure 6(a) shows. There are always
cascades of firms leaving with varying size. But it takes a considerable long time before the
network breaks down completely. Hence, we can conclude that the network intervention alone
already allows to delay the breakdown for a time T .
This finding can be contrasted with Figure 6(b), which shows that a combination of network and
node interventions is in fact able to prevent the breakdown of the network, completely. Even for a
very long time horizon T ' 50× 103, we do not notice larger cascades. We remind that cascades
always happen at every time step T , but their size is small in case of combined interventions.
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Again, to account for random effects in generating the networks we have run 100 simulations to
obtain values for Tˆ , which is the time where the cascade has caused more than 50% of the firms
leaving. For the scenario with combined interventions, we always find that Tˆ > T , i.e., there is
no breakdown observed. But it is still interesting to note the impact of network interventions
only. There we find an average value for Tˆ of about 13.000 time steps, but a median of about
1.300 time steps only. So, again we have a left skew distribution. While there is an improvement
of delaying cascades in comparison to the case of no intervention, we can argue that because of
the rather small median, this improvement is not large, in particular not if we compare it to the
improvement from the combined interventions.
To check the robustness of our results, we have also carried out simulations with N = 250 nodes,
a time horizon T ' 10× 103 time steps, and 50 runs. They confirm the findings discussed above.
For the combined interventions, we do not observe a breakdown for the given time horizon.
Considering network interventions only, we find that both the average and the median are about
the same, so instead of a left skew distribution we have a more symmetric one. With 7.100, their
value is close to the chosen time horizon. That means, a significant number of runs does not
show large cascades during this period. This suggests that network interventions alone become
quite efficient for larger networks.
5 Conclusions
Interventions are seen as one important possibility to improve the state of a system. To quantify
what kind of interventions would lead to an “improvement” requires an understanding of both
the structure and the dynamics of the target system. Thus, the topic can hardly be discussed in
an abstract manner. In this paper, we focus on a collaboration network of firms which exchange
knowledge to increase their knowledge stock. Such R&D networks play a vital role in innova-
tion economics and are therefore already studied empirically and theoretically [29, 16, 1, 22].
Hence, our investigations can build on established models for the dynamics of knowledge stock
and knowledge exchange. Less studied, so far, are possible intervention scenarios to improve
knowledge exchange.
In our paper, we have addressed one particular challenge for the R&D network, namely the
fact that firms terminate their collaborations and leave the R&D network if their expectations
about knowledge exchange are not met. This is a rational behavior because collaborations are
costly, thus the knowledge gain has to overcome some critical threshold. Specifically, to model the
decision to leave we have extended previous works by considering not only the firm’s knowledge
stock, but also their knowledge growth, i.e., their expectations about the development.
If firms decide to leave the network, this negatively impacts their collaborators and may lead
to cascades of firms leaving. With our different intervention scenarios, we want to mitigate this
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situation. “Improvement” means to either prevent such cascades, to reduce or to delay them, i.e.,
to increase the robustness of the R&D network. Our reference case is a scenario without any
investigations, for which we can calculate the size of cascades.
In our investigations, we make use of the fact that the dynamics of our model involves two
different time scales. On the shorter time scale t the knowledge stock of each firms changes, which
determines whether firms stay or leave the collaboration network. Based on their decisions, the
network changes on a larger time scale T . This modeling assumption allows us to separate the
two time scales. We are interested in the systems dynamics not asymptotically, but only for a
certain time horizon T , measured in time steps T . We consider this finite time horizon as relevant
for managers or politicians to monitor the network dynamics, to plan for interventions, and to
implement them.
Our intervention scenarios follow a bottom-up approach. That means, instead of improving the
situation of all firms equally by changing some global conditions, we try to identify a smaller set
of firms that should be incentivized. Such firms are called driver nodes in network controllability.
Formal approaches to identify minimal sets of driver nodes exist [37, 7, 15, 31, 18]. We apply
them here for the case of a non-linear dynamics of knowledge growth.
Further, we compare two different ranking schemes for driver nodes. In one case, we choose the
20% of firms with the highest knowledge stock, which are mostly high-degree nodes, in the other
case we choose instead the 20% of firms with the highest control contribution, which are often
low-degree nodes. Control contribution is a novel node level measure [37] that considers the
probability of a node to become a driver node and the size of the subnetwork that is controlled
by this node.
If a cascade of firms leaving is about to start, i.e., if 5% of firms already left, driver nodes are
incentivized to stay in the network, by lowering their costs by 10%. We emphasize that this is
a comparably small intervention, applied to only a small subset of 20% of all firms and only at
critical times. But this intervention is sufficient to considerably delay the emergence of a cascade
of firms leaving, as the results in Figure 3 demonstrates. We also find that driver nodes chosen
for their high control contribution are more effective in preventing cascades of firms leaving.
Our second intervention scenario uses a different approach, by combining interventions on the
node and on the network level. Network interventions are not targeted at specific firms. Instead,
replacing firms that left by new ones that randomly connect to the remaining firms allows a
continuous dynamics of the network. This takes into account that random changes can also lead
to an improvement. In situations where not much is to lose because cascades already happen, it
is certainly worth to be considered.
This intervention alone, however, is not able to prevent cascades of firms leaving, it can only
considerably delay them. The reason comes from the fact that new firms are usually not well
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integrated in the network. Therefore, to improve the situation, we also use a node intervention,
but only targeted at one driver node and only at about 10% of all time steps. This firm is forced
to leave the network, i.e., instead of reducing the costs, we increase them, for only this firm, such
that it is no longer attractive for the firm to stay.
While this intervention seems to be counter-intuitive, it indeed stabilizes the network such that
large cascades are prevented, as Figure 6 illustrates. That means, the controlled removal of one
firm, chosen the right way at the right time, sustains the network of knowledge transfer if it is
combined with the network intervention. The logic of this combined intervention is somewhat
similar to the mentioned wildfire prevention [38]. Allowing small wildfires from time to time
reduces the risk of a large wildfire considerably. Here, we demonstrate that this logic can be
successfully transferred also to an economic context.
Comparing the two different intervention scenarios discussed in this paper, we point to a number
of commonalities and differences. First of all, both scenarios are successful, if we consider our
minimal aim to prevent large cascades for a certain time horizon T . That means, we could buy
considerable time to further improve the situation by, e.g., management or policy decisions. The
maximal aim, namely to prevent large cascades completely, can be also achieved in the second
scenario. But from an economic viewpoint, this might not even be desirable. We remind on
Schumpeter’s idea of “creative destruction” as an important ingredient of innovation dynamics
and economic progress [20]. From this perspective, cascades of firms leaving the collaboration
network continuously test the stability, or the viability, of the knowledge transfer system. Pre-
venting the breakdown of an inefficient economic system might have advantages on very short
time scales, but definitely hamper its long-term evolution.
A major difference of both intervention scenarios is related to costs. In the first scenario, there is
the cost of identifying and accessing the driver nodes, which is not included in our model. But it
is obvious that firms with a high knowledge stock, which are mostly nodes with a high degree, are
likely more difficult to access and to influence. It could be a bit easier, from this perspective, to
access firms with a high control contribution which have a low degree. Then, there is the cost of
incentivizing the driver nodes, by lowering their costs, which has to be multiplied by the number
of driver nodes. Even if the incentives are small, they can sum up to a considerable amount.
In the second scenario, on the other hand, the intervention is not to reduce the costs of the
target firm, but to increase it. Additionally, only one firm needs to be controlled. The network
intervention, which is an important part of the second scenario, is not associated with costs for
incentives. Instead, the costs involved for the new firms to establish links to the network are
covered by these firms.
Eventually, the main reason why the different intervention scenarios have any impact on the
knowledge transfer between firms results from the interaction dynamics. Both the positive (reduc-
ing the costs) or the negative (increasing the costs) interventions not only impact the knowledge
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stock of the targeted firms. Because of the network effects underlying the knowledge production,
these interventions propagate to other firms and steer the evolution of the whole system toward a
desired system state. This state is characterized by a larger robustness against cascades of firms
leaving the network.
We emphasize that this way we reach a desired state that is an emerging property of the system,
not the merit of one or a few firms. Of course, interventions are targeted at specific firms. But
we remind that firms have only control over their outgoing links, while their knowledge growth is
entirely determined by incoming links. This points back to the earlier discussion about the role of
indirect reciprocity in knowledge transfer and innovation processes. Achieving a desired outcome
by means of bottom-up interventions is diametral to a greedy optimization procedure that only
accepts direct improvements of the agents involved. Instead, the robustness of the knowledge
transfer network or, the resilience of a system comprising a large number of agents in general, is
the result of targeted interventions that leverage indirect reciprocity and network effects.
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A Appendix
A.1 Explicit stationary solutions
Here we provide the detailed expressions for the stationary knowledge stocks of a network with
only two firms 1,2. Their dynamics was given in Eqn. (2) and their stationary solutions in
Eqn. (4), which we repeat here:
xstat1 = Q ; xstat2 =
Z
b
; Z = [c+ u1]Q2 + γQ
The function Q reads explicitely:
Q =
3
√
k
3 3
√
2
[−c3 − 2u1c2 − u21c] + 2
(
γc2 + γu1c
)
3
[−c3 − 2u1c2 − u21c]
−
3
√
2
{
3
(−cγ2 − bcγ − bu1γ) [−c3 − 2u1c2 − u21c]− 4 (γc2 + γu1c)2}
3
[−c3 − 2u1c2 − u21c] 3√k (8)
with k given by:
k =− 27b3c6 − 2γ3c6 + 9bγ2c6 − 108b3u1c5 − 6γ3u1c5 + 36bγ2u1c5 − 162b3u21c4 − 6γ3u21c4
+ 54bγ2u21c
4 − 108b3u31c3 − 2γ3u31c3 + 36bγ2u31c3 − 27b3u41c2 + 9bγ2u41c2 +
√
m (9)
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and m given by:
m =4
{
3
(−cγ2 − bcγ − bu1γ) [−c3 − 2u1c2 − u21c]− 4 (γc2 + γu1c)2}3
+
{
− 27b3c6 − 2γ3c6 + 9bγ2c6 − 108b3u1c5 − 6γ3u1c5 + 36bγ2u1c5 − 162b3u21c4 − 6γ3u21c4
+ 54bγ2u21c
4 − 108b3u31c3 − 2γ3u31c3 + 36bγ2u31c3 − 27b3u41c2 + 9bγ2u41c2
}2
(10)
A.2 Theorem for controlling two firms
Equation (6) states that, given a threshold xthr > 0, we can always find a critical value of the
intervention u˜1 such that the stationary knowledge stock of firm 2 (without intervention) is above
the threshold, while the knowledge stock of firm 1 (targeted by the intervention) is below the
threshold. We can formalise this statement in a simple theorem.
Theorem 1. Let xthr > 0 be a threshold and xstati (u1) be the stationary knowledge stocks of
firms i ∈ {1, 2, } with a control signal u ∈ R applied to firm 1. Then, as long as xthr ≤ xstat2 (0),
there is a value u˜ ∈ R such that:
xstat1 (u˜) ≤ xthr ≤ xstat2 (u˜) . (11)
In the following, we provide a sketch of its proof. There are two possible cases:
xthr = xstat1 (0) = x
stat
2 (0)
xthr < xstat1 (0) = x
stat
2 (0)
The first case is trivial. Choosing u˜ = 0 is the solution. For the other case, we use the expressions
given in Eqns. (4) and (8). With i ∈ {1, 2}, we can see xstati (u) ∈
(
0, xstati (0)
]
as monotonously
decreasing and continuous functions of u ∈ [0,∞). Hence, they are also bijective functions within
this interval. According to Eqn. (6), then, there exist a positive u˜ such that Eqn. (11) is satisfied.
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